"Chief Executive Compensation and Corporate Groups in Japan: New Evidence from Micro Data" by Takao Kato
Chief  Executive  Compensation  and 
Corporate  Groups  in  Japan: 
New  Evidence  from  Micro  Data 
Takao  Kate* 
Working  Paper  No.  117 
May  1994 
*Resident  Scholar,  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College  and  Associate  Professor  of  Economics, 
Colgate  University. 
Correspondence:  Takao  Kato 
The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute 
of  Bard  College 
PO  Box  5000 
Annandale-on-Hudson,  NY  12504-5000 
Phone:  914-758-7700  Fax:  914-758-1149 
Internet:  TKATO@CENTER.COLGATE.EDU 
I  am  grateful  to  Jeffrey  Pliskin  and  Yishay  Yafeh  for  helpful  comments. ABSTRACT 
This  paper  begins  with  addressing  a  simple  empirical  question:  how  much  Japanese  executives 
earn.  By  presenting  the  first  systematic  review  of  prior  studies  reporting  the  mean  level  of 
Japanese  executive  compensation,  I  conclude  that  the  best  available  answer  to  this  empirical 
question  is  that  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs  of  large  Japanese  firms  during  1980s  is 
between  30  to  45  million  yen,  roughly  one  third  of  what  the  US  counterparts  earn  in  salary  and 
bonus.  In  reaching  this  conclusion,  I  also  identify  three  major  data  sources  available  for 
empirical  studies  of  Japanese  executive  compensation  and  discuss  the  strengths  and  weaknesses 
of  each  data  source.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is devoted  to  a more  analytical  question:  What  is the 
relationship  between  executive  compensation  and  financial  corporate  groups  in  Japan,  an  issue 
that  has  not  been  previously  investigated.  By  using  micro  data  on  CEO  compensation  of  154 
large  Japanese  firms  consisting  of  116 group-affiliated  firms  and  38 independent  firms,  I find  that 
CEOs  of  group  firms  earn  20  to  30 % less  than  those  of  independent  firms,  after  controlling  for 
shareholder  returns,  accounting  measures  of profitability,  alternative  firm  objective  measures  such 
as  size  and  capital  investment,  and  personal  characteristics  of  CEOs.  I also  find  that  alternative 
firm  objectives,  measured  by  employment  and  capital  investment,  are  more  relevant  to  the 
determination  of  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms  than  that  of  independent  firms.  These 
findings  are  consistent  with  the  recent  contributions  in  the  literature  of  Japanese  corporate 
governance  stressing  the  role  of  banks  as  monitoring  agents  and  suggesting  that  managers  of 
group  firms  represent  not  only  the  interest  of  shareholders  but  the  interest  of  main  banks. 1 
CHIEF  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  AND  CORPORATE  GROUPS  IN  JAPAN: 
NEW  EVIDENCE  FROM  MICRO  DATA 
I.  Introduction 
This  paper  addresses  two  important  questions  in a growing  literature  of Japanese  executive 
compensation.  The  first  is a purely  empirical  question:  how  much  Japanese  executives  earn.  To 
address  the  question,  I  present  the  first  systematic  review  of  prior  studies  reporting  the  mean 
level  of  Japanese  executive  compensation.  The  best  available  answer  to  this  empirical  question 
turns  out  that  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs  of  large  Japanese  firms  during  1980s  is 
between  30  to  45  million  yen,  roughly  one  third  of  what  the  US  counterparts  earn  in  salary  and 
bonus.  In  reaching  this  conclusion,  I  identify  three  major  data  sources  available  for  empirical 
studies  of  Japanese  executive  compensation  and  discuss  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  each 
data  source,  which  I hope  will  be  of  use  to  future  empirical  work  on  the  subject. 
The  second  question  is  more  analytical:  What  is  the  relationship  between  executive 
compensation  and  financial  corporate  groups  (groups  of  firms  linked  by  their  relationships  to  a 
main  bank  and  by  cross-holding  of  equity)  in  Japan.  I  first  show  that  in  spite  of  rather 
impressive  recent  developments  in  the  literature  of  Japanese  corporate  governance,  no  attempt 
has  been  made  to  relate  a distinct  feature  of  financial  corporate  grouping  in  Japan  to  the  issue 
of  executive  compensation.  I  then  develop  three  testable  hypotheses  by  using  the  recent 
theoretical  developments  on  Japanese  corporate  governance  which  emphasize  the  role  of  banks 
as  monitoring  agents  and  on  compensation  schemes  as  incentives  in  the  principal-agent 
framework. 
According  to  the  “monitoring  and  control”  view  of  corporate  groups  in  Japan,  the 
managers  of  group-affiliated  firms  are  more  effectively  monitored  than  independent  firms  in 2 
Japan  because  the  system  of  main  bank  monitoring  tends  to  be  more  effective  than  the  market 
for  corporate  control  in  Japan.  It  follows  that  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms,  which  are 
under  more  effective  monitoring  and  control  by  main  banks,  is  more  restrained  than  that  of 
independent  firms,  which  are  under  less  effective  monitoring  and  control  by  the  market  for 
corporate  control. 
As  a  corollary,  one  can  also  develop  an  efficiency  wage  explanation  that  independent 
firms  pay  their  CEOs  more  than  group  firms  to make  managerial  shirking  prohibitively  expensive 
and  thus  compensate  for  the  relatively  weak  monitoring. 
Second,  the  monitoring  view  of Japanese  corporate  groups  imply  that  firm  objectives  other 
than  profitability  such  as  size  and  investment  may  be  more  relevant  to  group  firms  than 
independent  firms,  reflecting  not  only  the  interest  of  individual  shareholders  but  the  interest  of 
main  banks.  Third,  independent  firms  may  be  more  likely  to  use  an  upward-sloping  tenure- 
earnings  profiles  as  an  incentive  scheme  to  compensate  for  the  relatively  weak  monitoring  of 
their  CEOs. 
To  test  these  hypotheses,  I  extend  in  several  ways  the  micro  data  on  Japanese  CEO 
compensation  that  I developed  and  used  for  my  earlier  work.  Most  importantly,  I identify  which 
CEO  works  for  a group-affiliated  firm  and  which  works  for  an  independent  firm,  which  allows 
me  to  investigate  empirically  the  relationship  between  executive  compensation  and  corporate 
groups,  thus  to  test  the  hypotheses.  I  find  rather  strong  evidence  for  the  first  hypothesis  (CEOs 
working  for  group  firms  earn  20  to  30%  less  than  those  working  for  independent  firms);  some 
evidence  (not  as  strong  as  for  the  first  hypothesis)  for  the  second,  especially  employment  and 
investment  found  to  be  more  relevant  firm  objectives  for  group  firms  than  for  independent  firms; 
and  no  evidence  for  the  third  (no  significant  difference  in  the  slope  of  tenure-earnings  profiles 3 
for  CEOs  between  group  and  independent  firms). 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section,  I  review  prior  studies  reporting 
the  mean  level  of  executive  compensation.  Section  III  develops  testable  hypotheses,  while 
section  IV  provides  the  basic  empirical  strategy  and  describes  the  data.  In  section  V,  I present 
my  main  empirical  results,  followed  by  a concluding  section. 
II.  Prior  Studies  Reporting  the  Mean  Level  of  Japanese  Executive  Compensation 
In  spite  of  popular  beliefs  that  Japanese  executives  are  paid  far  less  than  their  US 
counterparts,  there  is no  consensus  amongst  scholars  on  exactly  how  much  Japanese  top  managers 
earn.  Table  1 summarizes  a  number  of  available  estimates  on  the  average  level  of  executive 
compensation  of  large  Japanese  firms.  As  seen,  the  estimates  vary,  reflecting  the  differences  in 
the  definitions  of  executive  compensation  and  data  sources. 
Unlike  in  the  U.S.,  corporate  proxy  statements  in  Japan  provide  no  information  on  the 
compensation  of  individual  executives.  Instead,  they  provide  information  on  total  salary  and 
bonus  earned  by  a  directors.  Earlier  work  by  Japanese  scholars  as well  as recent  work  by  US 
scholars  rely  on  this  aggregate  data  set.’  After  presenting  a number  of  important  findings  on  top 
management  turnover  in  large  Japanese  corporations,  for  instance,  Kaplan  (1992)  reports  that  the 
salary  and  bonus  of  the  average  director  of  large  Japanese  firms  is 63,900  dollars  over  the  period 
of  198 1-1984.  This  figure,  however,  understates  the  true  level  of  a  typical  director  of  large 
Japanese  corporations.  First,  the  total  salary  and  bonus  data  reported  in  corporate  proxy 
statements  include  part-time  directors.  According  to  the  Survey  on  Executive  Compensation, 
Reward,  and  Pensions  by  Romu  Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo in  1988,  the  average  part-time  director  earns 
‘See,  for  instance,  Ono  (1989),  Kaplan  (1992),  and  Ang  and  Constand  (1993). 4 
about  one  quarter  of  what  their  full-time  counterparts  earn  (see,  Rosei  Jiho,  1988:  14).  Moreover, 
the  same  survey  shows  that  more  than  80%  of  firms  with  1,000  or  more  employees  have  such 
part-time  directors  and  amongst  those  firms  with  part-time  directors,  the  average  board  of 
directors  includes  2.5  part-time  directors.  Since  the  same  survey  reports  that  the  average  board 
includes  19.2  full-time  directors,  the  part-time  directorship  is  hardly  negligible.  The  inclusion 
of  those  part-time  directors  will  significantly  lower  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  all directors. 
Second,  perhaps  more  importantly,  in  Japanese  publicly  held  corporations,  the  heads 
(called  “Bucho”)  of  major  functional  departments  such  as marketing,  accounting,  and  personnel, 
are  often  appointed  as  directors.  Nonetheless,  a  large  fraction  of  their  salary  is  paid  as  wage 
payments  for  employees  and  is  not  reported  as  the  salary  and  bonus  of  directors  in  corporate 
proxy  statements.  Again,  according  to  the  Survey  on  Executive  Compensation,  Reward,  and 
Pensions,  for  those  directors  who  are  also  the  heads  of  departments,  on  average,  only  one  third 
of  the  total  compensation  is  reported  as  executive  compensation  in  corporate  proxy  statements 
and  the  remaining  two  third  is paid  as “wage  payment”.  Rosei  Jiho  (1988:  16) estimates  that  the 
inclusion  of  such  “wage  payment”  will  increase  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  all  directors  by 
more  than  20°h.2 
Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  assemble  micro  data  on  chief  executive  compensation  by  using 
individual  income  tax  returns  of  599  CEOs  of  leading  Japanese  corporations.  They  report  that 
the  average  taxable  income  of  these  CEOs  in  1985  is  about  44  million  yen  (roughly  220,000 
dollars).  They  further  argue  that  the  taxable  income  of  these  CEOs  is reasonably  close  to  their 
21n spite  of  these  problems,  this  data  set  has  an  attractive  feature.  In  principle,  from  the 
data,  one  can  assemble  long  panel  data  on  executive  compensation  of  nearly  all  publicly 
traded  firms  in  Japan.  Furthermore,  since  the  name  of  each  corporation  is  not  hidden,  one 
can  merge  this  executive  compensation  data  set  with  the  standard  corporate  accounting  data  to 
study  a wide  variety  of  issues. 5 
total  compensation  by  pointing  out:  (i) the  limited  loopholes  for  income  tax  available  to  Japanese 
chief  executives;  (ii)  the  rarity  of  significant  income  sources  available  to  them  other  than  salary 
and  bonus  from  their  corporations;  and  (iii)  the  limited  use  of  stock  options  in  Japan.  As  seen 
below,  a number  of  small  survey  data  collected  by  private  consulting  firms  tend  to  support  their 
claim. 
Xu  (1992)  uses  responses  of  37  Japanese  manufacturing  firms  listed  in  the  first  section 
of  Japan’s  Stock  Exchanges  to  a survey  conducted  by  the  Seikei  Kenkyu  Jo  (Political  Economy 
Research  Institute),  a private  research  and  consulting  firm,  and  report  that  the  mean  salary  and 
bonus  of  CEOs  of  these  firms  during  1984-87  is  33  million  in  1985  constant  yen  (roughly  162 
thousand  dollars).  Rosei  Jiho  (1984)  uses  responses  of  38  Japanese  firms  with  10 billion  yen  or 
more  paid-in  capital  to  a  survey  conducted  by  Chingin  Kant-i  Kenkyu  Jo  (Wage  Management 
Research  Institute),  another  private  consulting  firm,  and  report  that  the  mean  salary  and  bonus 
of  CEOs  in  1983  is  41  million  yen  (roughly  122  thousand  dollars),  quite  close  to  the  Kato  and 
Rockel  (1992)‘s  taxable  income  figure.  Finally,  Rosei  Jiho  (1988)  reports  the  most  recent  survey 
data  results.  Using  responses  of  45  Japanese  firms  with  1,000  or  more  employees  to  a  survey 
conducted  by  Romu  Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo (Human  Resource  Management  Research  Institute),  they 
calculate  the  mean  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs  in  1988  to be  35 million  yen  (roughly  276  thousand 
dollars). 
In  sum,  prior  studies  on  Japanese  executive  compensation  suggest  that  the  average  salary 
and  bonus  of  CEOs  of  large  Japanese  firms  during  1980s  is  between  30  to  45  million  yen.  To 
evaluate  the  popular  belief  that  Japanese  CEOs  are paid  less  than  their  US  counterparts,  take  the 
least  conservative  estimate  of  Kato  and  Rockel(1992),  i.e.,  44 million  yen  (220  thousand  dollars) 
in  1985.  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  use  the  Business  Week’s  CEO  1000  to  calculate  the  mean 6 
salary  and bonus of CEOs of 506 US firms comparable  to  their  Japanese  sample  of  firms.  Their 
calculation  of  695  thousand  dollars  for  comparable  US  CEOs  suggests  that  Japanese  CEOs  are 
on  average  paid  about  one  third  of  what  their  US  counterparts  are  paid.3  It  is hard  to  deny  that 
Japanese  CEOs  are  paid  significantly  less  than  their  US  counterparts.4 
Rosei  Jiho  (1984,  1988)  also  report  the  internal  pay  structure  of  executives  of  large 
Japanese  firms.  I  will  focus  on  Rosei  Jiho  (1988)  that  provides  more  recent  and  more  detailed 
information.  First,  according  to  Rosei  Jiho  (1988),  the  size  of  the  board  of  directors  of  all  firms 
with  1,000  or  more  employees  is  on  average  21.2  directors  (19.2  full-time  and  2  part-time 
directors).  The  board  on  average  consists  of  one  CEO,  0.9  vice  CEO,  1.9  Senmu  (senior 
managing  directors),  4.4  Jomu  (managing  directors),  7.8 Torishimari  (junior  directors),  1.9 Kansa 
(statutory  auditors),  0.4  Kaicho  (retired  CEO  remaining  on  the  board  as chairman),  0.9  other  full- 
time  directors,  and  2 part-time  directors,  As  shown  in  Table  1, the  average  salary  and  bonus  of 
vice  CEOs  is  27  million  yen  (approximately  77%  of  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs). 
Likewise,  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  senior  managing  directors,  managing  directors  and 
statutory  auditors  are  22 million  yen  (63%  of  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs),  18 million 
yen  (5 l%),  and  12 million  yen  (34%)  respectively.  As  discussed  above,  there  are  two  types  of 
‘Xu (1992)  also  calculates  that  Japanese  CEOs  are  on  average  paid  one  third  of  what  their 
US  counterparts  are  paid.  I  am,  however,  aware  that  this  kind  of  comparison  is  incomplete, 
for  other  less  visible  forms  of  CEO  compensation  such  as  stock  options,  deferred 
compensation,  perks  are  not  considered.  The  data  on  these  forms  of  compensation  are  even 
harder  to  come  by  and  I  am  not  aware  of  any  serious  attempt  to  compare  these  forms  of 
compensation  between  Japan  and  the  US.  Nonetheless,  except  for  perks,  these  less  visible 
forms  of  compensation  may  not  be  too  important  in  Japan.  For  instance,  Aoki  (1988,  254) 
points  out  that  stock  option  plans  are  not  common  in  Japanese  corporations. 
41n addition,  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  report  that  the  average  compensation  of  Japanese 
CEOs  is  13 times  higher  than  the  average  compensation  of  all  employees  in  Japan  whereas 
the  average  compensation  of  the  US  counterparts  is  more  than  30  times  higher  than  the 
average  compensation  of  all  employees  in  the  U.S. 7 
junior  directors,  junior  directors  with  and  without  departmental  position.  The  average  salary  and 
bonus  of  junior  directors  without  departmental  positions  is  11 million  yen  (3 1%  of  the  average 
salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs).  The  average  salary  and  bonus  of junior  directors  with  departmental 
positions  is  14  million  yen  (40%),  of  which  only  one  quarter  is  reported  as  executive 
compensation  in  corporate  proxy  statements.  In  sum,  internal  pay  differentials  of  executives  by 
rank  appear  to be rather  substantial,  pointing  to possibly  strong  financial  incentives  for  promotion 
tournaments  amongst  managers  in  large  Japanese  corporations.’ 
III.  Executive  Compensation  and  Corporate  Groups:  Hypotheses 
Recently  a  number  of  scholars  have  begun  using  micro  data  to  conduct  econometric 
studies  of  Japanese  executive  compensation.  For  instance,  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  use  the 
aforementioned  micro  data  and  find  that  executive  compensation  in  Japanese  corporations  is 
structured  so  as  to  have  managers  penalized  for job  changes  whereas  U.S.  corporations  tend  to 
reward  managers  for  engaging  in job  hopping.  Thus  they  argue  that  it pays  Japanese  managers 
to  develop  long-term  relationships  with  the  firm,  an  argument  in  sharp  contrast  to  the 
cultural/traditional  view  stressing  the  importance  of  cultural  uniqueness  of  the  behavior  of 
Japanese  managers. 
Kaplan  (1992)  uses  the  aforementioned  firm-level  aggregate  compensation  data  and  finds 
evidence  for  positive  correlations  between  executive  compensation  and  firm  performance.  Xu 
(1992)  uses  the  aforementioned  small  data  set  and  tests  whether  Japanese  CEO  compensation  is 
structured  so as to maximize  the  interest  of  shareholders  or the  interest  of  employees.  His  results 
‘Kate  and  Taylor  (1994)  develops  a  search  model  of  promotion  tournaments  and  find 
some  evidence  for  the  relevance  of  promotion  tournaments  to  the  Japanese  managerial  labor 
market. tend  to  favor  the  neo-classical  hypothesis  of  Japanese  CEO  compensation  structured  so  as  to 
maximize  the  interest  of  shareholders.6 
8 
One  of  the  most  exciting  recent  developments  in  the  literature  of  the  Japanese  economy 
is theoretical  and  econometric  studies  of  Japanese  financial  corporate  groups  (financial  keiretsu), 
or  groups  of  firms  linked  by  their  relationships  to  a main  bank  and  by  cross-holding  of  equity.’ 
Nakatani  (1984)  is  one  of  the  first  attempts  to  use  firm-level  micro  data  to  conduct  an 
econometric  study  of  the  economic  effects  of belonging  to these  corporate  groups.  His  work  was 
followed  by  a  serious  of  econometric  studies  examining  specific  effects  of  these  groups  using 
often  more  sophisticated  econometric  methods.  For  instance,  Hoshi,  Kashyap,  Scharfstein  (1990 
and  1991)  look  at  the  effects  on  investment  of  belonging  to  corporate  groups  or  having  strong 
ties  to  main  banks;  Lichtenberg  and  Pushner  (1992)  study  the  effects  on  productivity  and 
profitability  of  equity  ownership  of  main  banks;  Merck  and  Nakamura  (1992),  Anderson, 
Jayaraman,  Mandelker  (1992),  and  Kaplan  and  Minton  (1993)  examine  the  main  bank  influence 
on  the  board  member  appointments;  Weinstein  and  Yafeh  (1993)  examine  the  effects  on  price- 
cost  margins  of belonging  to  corporate  groups;  Montalvo  and  Yafeh  (1993)  investigate  the  effects 
on  the  acquisition  of  foreign  technology  of  belonging  to  corporate  groups;  and  Weinstein  and 
Yafeh  (1994)  study  the  effects  on  the  use  of  capital  intensive  technologies  and  firm  performance 
of  being  a main  bank  client. 
61n addition,  I  am  aware  of  a number  of  ongoing  econometric  studies  on  Japanese 
executive  compensation  such  as  Ang  and  Constand  (1993),  and  Hebner  and  Kato  (1994). 
7There  is,  however,  another  kind  of  corporate  groups  called  enterprise  keiretsu,  organized 
around  a nonfinancial  enterprise  such  as Toyota  and  characterized  by  cross-holdings  of  equity 
and  very  strong  product-market  links.  These  groups  have  not  been  studied  as  extensively  as 
financial  corporate  groups.  This  paper  will  focus  on  financial  corporate  groups  like  most  of 
prior  work. 9 
In  spite  of  the  recent  rapid  growth  of both  the  Japanese  executive  compensation  literature 
and  the  Japanese  corporate  groups  literature,  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  investigate  the 
relationship  between  executive  compensation  and  corporate  groups  in  Japan.  For  the  rest  of  the 
section  I  develop  three  testable  hypotheses  by  using  the  recent  theoretical  developments  on 
Japanese  corporate  governance  which  emphasize  the  role  of  banks  as monitoring  agents  and  on 
compensation  schemes  as  incentives  in  the  principal-agent  framework.  The  first  concerns  the 
effects  on  the  level  of  executive  compensation  of  corporate  groups  and  the  other  two  concern  the 
effects  on  the  determinants  of  executive  compensation  of  corporate  groups.  These  hypotheses 
will  be  tested  in  the  subsequent  sections. 
H,:  CEOs  of group  firms  are paid less than  those  of independent  firms,  cetris  paribus. 
According  to  the  “monitoring  and  control”  view  of  corporate  groups  in  Japan,  the 
managers  of  group-affiliated  firms  are  more  effectively  monitored  than  independent  firms  in 
Japan  because  the  system  of  main  bank  monitoring  tends  to  be  more  effective  than  the  market 
for  corporate  control  in  Japan.  For  instance,  Aoki  (1988:  142-149)  argues  that  the  market  for 
corporate  control,  or  the  takeover  discipline  may  not  be  an  effective  mechanism  for  monitoring 
and  controlling  the  behavior  of  managers  in  Japan.  First,  the  board  of  directors  of  Japanese 
corporations  “functions  as  a de  facto  substructure  of  the  management  system  subordinate  to  the 
representative  (and  permanent)  directors.”  Second,  the  general  meeting  of the  stockholders  tends 
to  be  a  mere  formality.  Finally,  takeovers  in  Japan  tends  to  entail  prohibitively  high  cost  of 
reorganization  of  internal  organizations  of  the  Japanese  firm  with  well  developed  internal  labor 
markets,  resulting  in  making  takeovers  an  empty  threat.  Aoki  (1988)  then  points  to  the  main 
bank  monitoring  as  a more  effective  alternative.  Recent  empirical  studies  including  Merck  and 10 
Nakamura  (1992)  and  Kaplan  (1993)  provide  evidence  for  this  monitoring  and  control  view  of 
Japanese  corporate  groups. 
It  follows  that  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms  under  more  effective  monitoring  and 
control  by  main  banks  is  more  restrained  than  that  of  independent  firms  under  less  effective 
monitoring  and  control  by  the  market  for  corporate  control. 
As  a corollary,  one  can  also  use  the  efficiency  wage  theory  to  argue  for  the  higher  CEO 
compensation  of  independent  firms.  The  absence  of  main  banks  as an effective  monitor  calls  for 
an  alternative  to  bank  monitoring  for  independent  firms.  Since  the  market  for  corporate  control 
is relatively  weak  in  Japan,  shareholders  may  resort  to  an  efficiency  wage  solution,  i.e.,  paying 
their  CEO  a wage  sufficiently  higher  than  his  market  alternative  so  that  shirking  will  not  pay  for 
him.8 
H,:  The  role  of  alternative  firm  objectives  in  the  determination  of CEO  compensation  is 
more important  in  group  firms  than in independent  firms. 
Managers  of  group-affiliated  firms  pursue  not  only  the  interest  of  shareholders  but  the 
interest  of  main  banks.  It  follows  that  firm  objectives  other  than  profitability  may  be  more 
relevant  to  group-affiliated  firms  than  to  independent  tirms.  In  particular,  recently,  Weinstein 
and  Yafeh  (1993)  use  a  formal  model  in  which  group-affiliated  firms  maximize  a  weighted 
average  of  the  shareholders’  and  the  main  bank’s  utility  function  and  show  that  group-affiliated 
‘Though  still  highly  speculative,  one  can  argue  that  the  post-retirement  opportunities  for 
CEOs may  be  greater  for  group  firm  CEOs  than  for  independent  firm  CEOs.  For  instance, 
retiring  CEOs  of  group  firms  may  be  able  to  land  a lucrative  job  on  the  board  of  other  group 
firms  belonging  to  the  same  keiretsu  group  whereas  this  kind  of  opportunity  may  be  more 
limited  for  retiring  CEOs  of  independent  firms.  If  this  speculation  is  correct,  it  will  follow 
that  compensating  wage  differentials  require  the  compensation  of  independent  firm  CEOs  to 
be  greater  than  that  of  group  firm  CEOs. 11 
firms  are  more  likely  to  pursue  firm  size  and  capital  investment  rather  than  profit.  An  intuition 
is  that  the  main  bank  captures  most  of  the  rents  through  high  interest  payments  and  through 
pressure  on  member  firms  to  use  bank-financed  capital  inputs  more  than  standard  profit 
maximization  dictates.  Thus,  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms  may  well  be  structured  so  as 
to  reflect  these  alternative  objective  measures  more  so  than  that  of  independent  firms. 
H3:  Tenure-earnings  profiles  of  CEOs  of  group  firms  are  less  steeper  than  those  of 
independent  firms. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  efficiency  wage  justification  for  H,,  one  can  argue  that  independent 
firms  in  Japan  need  an  alternative  incentive  mechanism  to  main  bank  monitoring.  Aside  from 
an  efficiency  wage  mechanism,  perhaps  the  more  well  known  mechanism  is  upward-sloping 
tenure  wage  profiles.  One  can  argue  that  tenure-earnings  profiles  of  CEOs  of  independent  firms 
need  to  be  steeper  so  as  to  compensate  for  the  absence  of  bank  monitoring.’ 
IV. The  Data  and Empirical  Strategy 
As  discussed  above,  there  are  three  major  data  sources  on  Japanese  executive 
compensation:  (i)  firm-level  aggregate  data  on  total  compensation  earned  by  all  directors  from 
corporate  proxy  statements;  (ii)  micro  data  on  taxable  income  of  individual  CEOs  from  income 
tax  returns;  and  (iii)  small  micro  data  on  salary  and  bonus  of  individual  CEOs  from  responses 
to  surveys  by  private  consulting  and  research  firms.  None  of  these  data  provides  information  on 
long-term  compensation  such  as  stock  options,  deferred  compensation  and  perks.  However,  I 
argue  that  the  neglect  of  these  less  visible  forms  of  CEO  compensation  may  not  pose  as  serious 
9As discussed  before,  the  use  of  stock  options  is  limited  in  Japan. a  problem  as  in  the  case  of  US  CEO  compensation.  Except  for  perks,  these  forms  of 
compensation  are  probably  not  as  wide-spread  as  in  the  US.  For  instance,  Aoki  (1988,  254) 
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points  out  that  stock  option  plans  are  not  common  in  Japanese  corporations.  Furthermore, 
Lichtenberg  and  Pushner  (1992)  report  that  average  level  of  equity  ownership  by  directors 
(insider  ownership)  is  quite  low  in  Japan  (6%  in  their  Japanese  sample  as  compared  to  10.6% 
in  a  comparable  US  sample).  Finally,  even  if  these  less  visible  forms  of  compensation  are 
present,  the  neglect  of  these  forms  of  compensation  would  not  be  a  problem  insofar  as  the 
amount  of  these  forms  of  compensation  are  not  systematically  related  to  whether  the  firm  is 
group-affiliated  or independent.  I am  not  aware  of any  evidence  (including  anecdotes)  suggesting 
that  group  firms  tend  to  use  more  or  less  these  less  visible  forms  of  compensation  than 
independent  firms. 
In  this  paper  I  choose  to  use  the  tax  return  data  for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  the 
corporate  proxy  data  are  subject  to usual  aggregation  bias,  i.e.,  changes  in the  composition  of  the 
board  will  affect  the  salary  and  bonus  earned  by  all  directors.  In  addition,  as  discussed  above, 
they  are  subject  to rather  substantial  underreporting  of the  salary  and  bonus  earned  by  the  average 
full-time  director.  Finally,  since  corporate  group  affiliations  do  not  change  over  time,”  the 
panel  nature  of  the  corporate  proxy  data,  sometimes  a major  attraction  of  this  data  set,  is  not  of 
great  use  for  studying  the  relationships  between  corporate  groups  and  executive  compensation. 
In  other  words,  I cannot  separate  the  effects  of  group-affiliations  from  other  time  invariant  firm 
specific  effects  in  a fixed  effect  model. 
Second,  the  private  survey  data  do  not  reveal  the  identity  of  the  firm.  Thus,  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  merge  this  compensation  data  with  the  firm  accounting  data  available  from 
“See,  for  instance,  Hoshi,  Kashyap  and  Scharfstein  (1991). 13 
corporate  proxy  statements.  The  absence  of  data  on  firm  characteristics 
performance  measures,  and  sales  makes  this  data  set  unsuitable  for  multivariate 
such  as  size, 
analysis.” 
I  extend  the  taxable  income  data  assembled  by  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  in  several  ways 
to  make  it  suitable  to  the  purpose  of  the  paper.12  First,  I  use  Nakatani  (1992)‘s  classification 
of  group  affiliations  of  3 17  manufacturing  firms  listed  in  the  first  section  of  Tokyo  Stock 
Exchange  to  create  a dummy  variable,  GROUP,  which  is  equal  to  unity  if  CEO’s  firm  belongs 
to  one  of  the  six  major  financial  corporate  groups,  and  zero  otherwise.13  The  dummy  variable 
is  successfully  created  for  154  CEOs  (firms).  As  shown  in  Table  2,  116  of  them  belong  to  one 
of  the  six  major  financial  corporate  groups  and  the  remaining  38  are  independent.14 
Second,  for  the  resulting  154  CEOs  (firms),  I use  Oriental  Economist’s  Kaisha  Shiki  Ho 
to  collect  the  following  additional  information:  (i)  ROA  (return  on  asset  during  the  1985 
accounting  year  as  an  additional  accounting  measure  of  firm’s  profitability);  (ii)  PROFIT 
MARGIN  (profit  margin  during  the  1985  accounting  year  as  an  additional  accounting  measure 
of  firm’s  profitability);  (iii)  ASSET  (total  assets  as of  the  end  of  the  1985  accounting  year  as an 
“In  theory,  it  is possible  to  use  personal  characteristics  of  CEOs  such  as  years  as  CEO 
along  with  industry  classifications  to  identify  each  firm  with  reasonably  high  confidence, 
using  one  of  several  published  directories  of  Japanese  directors  that  also  provide  information 
on  personal  characteristics  of  CEOs  (of  course,  except  for  compensation)  and  the  name  of  the 
firm.  Xu  (1992)  is  able  to  use  this  method  to  identify  37  firms.  I  opt  for  the  larger  data  of 
taxable  income  since  the  data  on  taxable  income  are  quite  close  to  the  data  on  the  salary  and 
bonus  from  these  private  surveys  as  shown  in  Table  1. 
“For  detailed  description  of  the  sources  and  methods  used  to  assemble  the  data,  see  Kato 
and  Rockel  (1992). 
13To create  the  group  dummy  by  using  Nakatani  (1984)‘s  classification,  which  is  a 
refinement  of  Keiretsu  no  Kenkyu,  seems  to  be  a  standard  practice  in  the  literature. 
‘This  ratio  of  group-affiliated  to  independent  firms  is  similar  to  what  Hoshi,  Kashyap, 
Scharfstein  (199 l),  Anderson,  Jayaraman,  Mandelker  (1992)  report.  In  addition  to  these  154 
firms,  there  are  a handful  of  firms  categorized  as  subsidiaries.  Including  these  firms  in  any 
way  does  not  change  the  results. 14 
additional  measure  of  firm  size);  (iv)  INVESTMENT  (plant  and  equipment  investment  during  the 
1985  accounting  year  as  an  alternative  firm  objective  measure);  and  (v)  R&D  (research  and 
development  expenditures  during  the  1985  accounting  year  as  an  alternative  firm  objective 
measure). 
As  shown  in  Table  2,  during  the  1985  calendar  year,  the  average  CEO  of  group  firms 
earns  40  million  yen  whereas  the  average  CEO  of  independent  firms  earns  46  million  yen. 
Though  one  needs  to  wait  for  the  final  verdict  till  multivariate  regressions  analysis  is  completed 
in  the  next  section,  this  tends  to  favor  the  hypothesis  of  group  firm  CEOs  being  paid  less  than 
independent  firm  CEOs.  The  data  allow  me  to  use  as  a  stock  market  performance  measure 
inflation-adjusted  market  return  to  stockholding  (the  rate  of  equity  appreciation  plus  dividends 
rate  minus  inflation  rate  during  the  1985  calendar  year),  SHAREHOLDER  R.ETURN.15  Table 
2  shows  that  market  return  to  stockholding  of  independent  firms  is  almost  twice  as  high  as  that 
of  group  tirms.  Furthermore,  although  not  as dramatic  as the  stock  market  measure,  accounting 
measures  of  firm  profitability  (ROA  and  PROFIT  MARGIN)  are  also  higher  for  independent 
firms  than  for  group  firms.  All  these  results  seem  to be  consistent  with  Nakatani  (1984)‘s  initial 
finding  that  group  furns  may  not  be  a simple  profit  maximizer. 
The  data  further  enable  me  to  consider  five  alternative  firm  objective  measures. 
EMPLOYMENT  (number  of  workers  as of  the  end  of  the  1985  accounting  year),  SALES  (sales 
during  the  1985  accounting  year),  and  ASSET  are  standard  firm  size  measures  often  used  in  the 
literature  to  capture  alternative  firm  objectives.  INVESTMENT  and  R&D  are  considered  to 
“Due  to  data  availability,  data  on  compensation  and  shareholder  returns  are  for  the  1985 
calendar  year  whereas  the  rest  of  the  data  are  for  the  1985  accounting  year.  This  discrepancy 
could  be  a problem  if  one  extends  the  data  to  a panel  data  set  and  estimates  fixed  effect 
models.  However,  for  a  single  year  cross  section  analysis,  I do  not  believe  this  imposes  any 
serious  problem. 15 
capture  specifically  capital  investment,  and  long-term  performance  of  the  firm  as  an  alternative 
firm  objective.  It  is  conceivable  (and  predicted  from  the  model  of  group  firm  behavior  by 
Weinstein  and  Yafeh,  1993)  that  group  firms  maximize  size  and  capital  investment.  As  shown 
in  Table  2,  employment,  sales  and  assets  of  group  firms  are  indeed  larger  than  those  of 
independent  firms.  Moreover,  group  firms  invest  more  and  spend  more  on  research  and 
development  than  independent  firms.  All  these  findings  are  consistent  with  the  notion  that  group 
firms  are  allowed  (or  forced  by  main  banks)  to  pursue  size,  capital  investment,  and  long-term 
goalsI 
Using  panel  data  to  estimate  fixed  effects  models  would  allow  me  to  drop  all  time- 
invariant  variables  such  as  diverse  personal  characteristics  of  CEOs  (provided  that  there  is  no 
change  in  CEOs  during  the  sample  period).  Since  I cannot  (and  do  not  want  to)  estimate  fixed 
effects  models,  I  do  need  to  include  variables  to  control  for  various  personal  characteristics  of 
CEOs.  Moreover,  to  test  H,,  I  need  to  include  tenure  of  CEOs.  Fortunately,  the  data  are 
reasonably  rich  in  personal  characteristics,  and  allow  me  to  include  six  variables  to  control  for 
them.  Since  these  variables  are  explained  in  detail  in  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992),  I  discuss  them 
very  briefly.  First,  the  data  allow  me  to  include  YEARS  AS  CHIEF  EXECUTIVE,  the  number 
of  years  that  each  CEO  has  spent  as  CEO  of  the  current  firm  to  test  H,. 
Second,  the  variable  YEARS  OUTSIDE  FIRM  represents  the  number  of  years  that  each 
chief  executive  spent  after  finishing  his  undergraduate  degree  (or  completing  high  school  for 
those  without  college  degrees)  and  before  joining  his  current  firm.  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  find 
negative  and  significant  correlations  between  this  variable  and  CEO  compensation  for  Japan  and 
‘6That  group  firms  invest  more  and  spend  more  on  R&D  is  also  consistent  with  Hoshi, 
Kashyap,  Scharfstein  (1991)‘s  view  of  group  firms  enjoying  more  liquidity  than  independent 
fkITlS. 16 
the  opposite  result  for  the  U.S..  They  then  argue  that  the  structure  of  CEO  compensation  in 
Japan  is  structured  so  as  to  encourage  young  managers  to  develop  long-term  relationships  with 
the  firm  in  Japan  whereas  the  reverse  incentive  exists  in  the  U.S. 
The  third  control  variable,  YEARS  IN  FIRM  BEFORE  PROMOTION,  represents  the 
number  of  years  that  each  chief  executive  spent  after  joining  the  current  firm  and  before 
becoming  chief  executive.  In  the  standard  human  capital  interpretation,  YEARS  lN  FIRM 
BEFORE  PROMOTION  is a measure  of  the  quantity  of  human  capital  acquired  through  working 
in  the  current  firm  prior  to  becoming  chief  executive.  To  the  extent  that  this  human  capital 
improves  the  chief  executive’s  abilities,  it  is  expected  to  be  positively  correlated  with 
compensation.  Alternatively,  YEARS  IN FIRM  BEFORE  PROMOTION  also measures  the  speed 
of  promotion,  where  faster  promotion  may  signal  higher  innate  ability,  for  which  the  chief 
executive  is  rewarded.  The  signalling  view  predicts  that  YEARS  IN  FIRM  BEFORE 
PROMOTION  and  compensation  are  negatively  correlated.  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992)  find 
evidence  for  the  signaling  view. 
Lastly,  I  create  several  dummy  variables  capturing  various  aspects  of  educational 
credentials.  The  dummy  variable  NO  COLLEGE  is equal  to unity  if the  chief  executive  does  not 
hold  a college  degree  and  is zero  otherwise.  A  similarly  defined  dummy  variable  is  often  used 
in  empirical  studies  of  wage  determination.  I  further  create  a  dummy  variable,  TOKYO,  that 
equals  to  unity  if  CEO  holds  a college  degree  from  the  University  of  Tokyo  (arguably  the  most 
effective  signal  of  ability  in  the  Japanese  society),  and  zero  otherwise.  Finally,  the  data  enable 
me  to  create  ECONOMICS  that  equals  to  unity  if  CEO  holds  a  degree  in  Economics  and/or 
business  and  is  zero  otherwise. 
Table  2  shows  a rather  interesting  difference  in  the  profiles  of  CEOs  working  for  group filTllS 
more 
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and  for  independent  firms.  CEOs working  for group  firms  have  less  outside  experience, 
inside  experience  prior  to  the  promotion  to  CEO,  shorter  tenure  as  CEO,  and  more 
education  than CEOs working  for independent  firms.  These profiles  seem to be largely  consistent 
with the notion  that the long-term  employment  of managers  is complementary  to the bank-based 
corporate  governance  in Japan.” 
Using  the  extended  CEO  compensation  data,  I  estimate  standard  earnings  functions 
augmented  by  the  corporate  group  dummy  variable,  GROUP: 
In (CEO  COMPENSATION,)  = u +  p(GROUPi)  + r(SHAREHOLDER 
+ C1(ACCOUNTPNGi)  + Oln(ALTERNATIVEi) 
+ G(YEARS AS  CEO;) + I,’  +  ui 
RETURN,) 
(1) 
where  ACCOUNTING,  is  an accounting  measure  of profitability  of  the  firm  for  which  CEO  i 
works,  measured  either  by ROA or PROFIT  MARGIN;  ALTERNATrVEi  is an alternative  firm 
objective  measure  of  the  firm  for  which  CEO  i  works,  measured  either  by  EMPLOYMENT, 
SALES, ASSET,  INVESTMENT,  or R&D; Z, is a vector of all control  variables  discussed  above 
and  10 industry  dummy  variables;  and  u  is  a disturbance  term.‘*  H,  (CEOs  of  group  fil-KlS 
earning  less  than  those  of  independent  CEOs) will  be  supported  if  the  OLS  estimates  of  P are 
negative  and  significant. 
To  test  H,  (alternative  objectives  being  more  important  for  group  firms  than  for 
“See,  for  instance,  Sheard  (1992a). 
“Using  a loglinear  version  of the  earnings  function  is standard  practice  in the related 
literature.  We also  estimated  linear  versions  and obtained  qualitatively  similar  results.  (These, 
and other,  unreported  regression  results  are available  from  the author  upon  request.) 
Moreover,  one may  be tempted  to include  all alternative  firm  objective  measures 
simultaneously  as an alternative  specification.  Unfortunately,  multicollinearity  between  these 
measures  makes  the parameter  estimates  rather  imprecise.  For the  same reason,  I prefer  not 
to include  ROA  and  PROFIT  MARGIN  simultaneously. 18 
independent  firms),  I add  an  interaction  term  involving  GROUP  and  ln(ALTERNATIVE)  to  Eq. 
(1): 
In  (CEO  COMPENSATION,)  =  a  +  /3(GROUPi)  +  +(GROUP,)*ln(ALTERNATIVEJ 
+ z(SHAREHOLDER  RETURN,)  +  p(ACCOUNTING,) 
+  Oln(ALTERNATIVE,)  +  G(YEARS  AS  CEO,)  +  1&’  +  Ui (2) 
H,  will  be  supported  if  the  OLS  estimates  of  (b are  positive  and  significant. 
Lastly,  to  test  H,  (less  steeper  tenure-earnings  profiles  for  group  firms  than  for 
independent  firms),  I  add  another  interaction  term  involving  GROUP  and  YEARS  AS  CEO  to 
Eq.  (2): 
In  (CEO  COMPENSATION,)  =  CC  +  p(GROUP,)  +  n(GROUPJ*(YEARS  AS  CEO,) 
+  +(GROUPJ*In(ALTERNATIVEJ  +  r(SHAREHOLDER  RETURN;) 
+  u(ACCOUNTING,)  +  Oln(ALTERNATIVE,)  +  &YEARS  AS  CEO;) 
+  hi’  +  Ui  (3) 
H,  will  be  supported  if  the  OLS  estimates  of  n  are  negative  and  significant.‘g 
V.  Results 
Table  3A  report  the  OLS  estimates  of  Eq.(l)  with  ROA  used  as  an  accounting  measure 
of  firm  profitability.  Regardless  of the  choice  of  ALTERNATIVE,  the  estimated  coefficients  on 
GROUP  are  always  negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero  at the  5%  level,  supporting  H, 
that  CEOs  of  group  firms  earn  less  than  those  of  independent  firms,  other  things  being  equa1.20 
“1  also  consider  an  alternative  specification  where  the  interaction  term  involving  GROUP 
and  YEARS  AS  CEO  is  added  to  Eq.  (1)  instead  of  Eq.  (2)  and  find  no  change  in  the  results. 
20Since  a Breusch-Pagan  test  rejected  the  hypothesis  of  homoskedasticity,  all  standard 
errors  are  calculated  by  using  White’s  correction  procedure  for  heteroskedasticity. 19 
Furthermore  the  size of  the  estimated  coefficients  imply  rather  substantial  negative  effects  on 
compensation  of corporate  groups, i.e., reduction  of compensation  due to working  for group firms 
ranging  from  21%  (=e”,‘8721-1)  to 27% (=e”.23741-1). 
The rest of the estimates  in the table reconfirm  and in some instances  reinforce  the results 
of  Kato  and  Rockel  (1992):  (i)  positive  and  highly  significant  correlations  between 
ALTERNATIVE  and CEO COMPENSATION  for all five specifications  with different  measures 
for ALTERNATIVE  (pay  elasticity  ranging  from  0.09 to 0.14);  (ii)  positive  yet  somewhat  less 
significant  correlations  between  ROA  (accounting  measure)  and CEO  COMPENSATION;  (iii) 
insignificant  correlations  between  SHAREHOLDER  RETURN (stock market  measure)  and CEO 
COMPENSATION;  (iv) significant  upward sloping tenure-earnings  profiles;  and (v) negative  and 
mostly  significant  correlations  between  YEARS OUTSIDE  FIRM and CEO COMPENSATION. 
To  see if the  above  results  are sensitive  to the choice  of  an accounting  measure  of  firm 
profitability,  I further estimate Eq. (1) using PROFIT MARGIN  instead of ROA as an accounting 
measure  of profitability.  Table 3B reports the estimates and point to the robustness  of my results 
with  respect  to the  choice  of  an accounting  measure  of profitability. 
Tables  4A  and  4B report  the  OLS estimates  of Eq.  (2).  As H,  indicates,  the  estimated 
coefficients  on  the  interaction  term  involving  GROUP  and  ln(ALTERNATIVE)  are  positive, 
suggesting  that  alternative  firm  objective  measures  are  more  relevant  to  group  firms  than  to 
independent  firms.  However,  the  estimates  are not  sufficiently  and  consistently  significant  to 
warrant  conclusive  tests.  Thus,  insofar  as EMPLOYMENT  and INVESTMENT  are concerned, 
the coefficients  on the interaction  term  are positive  and significant  at the  10% level  whereas  the 
coefficients  on  the  interaction  term  are  positive  yet  not  significant  at  the  10%  level  for  the 
remaining  alternative  firm  objective  measures.  In  sum,  I  find  some  evidence  for  H,  yet  the 20 
evidence  is  not  as  strong  as  the  one  for  H,. 
Lastly,  Tables  5A  and  5B  report  the  OLS  estimates  of  Eq.  (3).  As  shown  in  the  tables, 
the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  interaction  term  involving  GROUP  and  YEARS  AS  CEO  are 
always  insignificant,  offering  no  evidence  for  H,.2’ 
VI.  Concluding  Remarks 
This  paper  addressed  two  important  questions  in  a  growing  literature  of  Japanese 
executive  compensation.  The  first  was  a  purely  empirical  question:  how  much  Japanese 
executives  earn.  By  presenting  the  first  systematic  review  of  prior  studies  reporting  the  mean 
level  of  Japanese  executive  compensation,  I  concluded  that  the  best  available  answer  to  this 
empirical  question  is that  the  average  salary  and  bonus  of  CEOs  of  large  Japanese  firms  during 
1980s  is  between  30  to  45  million  yen,  roughly  one  third  of  what  the  US  counterparts  earn  in 
salary  and  bonus.  In  reaching  this  conclusion,  I also  identified 
for  empirical  studies  of  Japanese  executive  compensation 
weaknesses  of  each  data  source. 
three  major  data  sources  available 
and  discussed  the  strengths  and 
The  second  was  a  more  analytical  one:  What  is  the  relationship  between  executive 
compensation  and  financial  corporate  groups  in  Japan,  an  issue  that  has  not  been  previously 
investigated.  By  using  micro  data  on  CEO  compensation  of  154 large  Japanese  firms  consisting 
of  116  group-affiliated  firms  and  38  independent  firms,  I  found  that  CEOs  of  group  firms  earn 
20  to  30  %  less  than  those  of  independent  firms,  after  controlling  for  shareholder  returns, 
2’In addition,  I  also  add  an  interaction  term  involving  GROUP  and  ACCOUNTING  to  Eq. 
(1)  and  estimate  it  to  see  if  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms  is  less  sensitive  to  an 
accounting  measure  of  firm  profitability  than  that  of  independent  firms.  I  find  that  the 
estimated  coefficients  on  the  interaction  term  are  always  insignificant. 21 
accounting  measures  of  profitability,  alternative  firm  objective  measures  such  as  size  and 
investment,  and  personal  characteristics  of  CEOs.  The  finding  is  consistent  with  the  recent 
theoretical  developments  on  Japanese  corporate  governance  which  emphasize  the  role  of  banks 
as  monitoring  agents  and  on  compensation  schemes  as  incentives  in  the  principal-agent 
framework.  I  also  found  that  alternative  firm  objectives,  measured  by  employment  and 
investment,  are  more  relevant  to the  determination  of  CEO  compensation  of  group  firms  than  that 
of  independent  firms.  Though  this  finding  is  somewhat  less  significant  than  the  first  finding,  it 
is  consistent  with  the  recent  contributions  in  the  literature  of  Japanese  corporate  governance 
stressing  that  managers  of  group  firms  represent  not  only  the  interest  of  shareholders  but  the 
interest  of  main  banks. References 
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OF  EXECUTIVE  COMPENSATION  OF  LARGE  JAPANESE  FIRMS 
Study  Data  source  Time  Sample  Definition  of  the  Estimates  on 
Period  size  level  of  executive  the  mean  level 
compensation  of  executive 
compensation 
Kaplan  Corporate  Proxy  1981-  415  Total  salary  and  63,900  dollars. 
(1992)  Statements  of  119  leading  1984  bonus  earned  by 
Japanese  industrials  which  all  directors, 
were  included  in  Fortune  divided  by  the 
Magazine’s  list  of  the  500  number  of 
largest  foreign  industrials  directors. 
in  1980. 
Kato  Income  Tax  Returns  of  1985  599  Taxable  income  44,406,OOO yen 
and  599  individual  CEOs  of  reported  in  1985  (roughly 
Rockel  Japanese  firms  that  are  income  tax  returns  220,000 
(1992)  included  in  the  top  1,000  of  each  CEO.  dollars).” 
firms  in  terms  of  their 
market  values. 
xu  Responses  of  37  Japanese  1984-  104  Salary  and  bonus  32,522,OOO yen 
(1992)  manufacturing  firms  listed  1987  earned  by  each  (roughly 
in  the  first  section  of  CEO.  162,000 
Stock  Exchanges  to  a  dollars). 
survey  conducted  by 
Seikei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Rosei  Responses  of  38  Japanese  1983  38  Salary  and  bonus  4 1,350,OOO yen 
Jiho  firms  with  10 billion  yen  earned  by  each  (roughly 
(1984)  or  more  paid-in  capital  to  CEO.  178,000 
a  survey  conducted  by  dollars). 
Chingin  Kanri  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Not  Salary  and  bonus  28,260,OOO yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (roughly 
vice  CEO/Senmu  122,000 
(senior  managing  dollars). 
director). 
Not  Salary  and  bonus  19,710,OOO yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (roughly 
Jomu  (managing  85,000 
director).  dollars). Rosei 
Jiho 
(1988) 
1988  Responses  of  45 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to  a survey 
conducted  by  Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Not  Salary  and bonus  27,390,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (rough1  y 
vice  CEO.  218,000 
dollars). 
Not  Salary  and bonus  2 1,760,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (rough1  y 
Senmu  (senior  173,000 
managing  dollars). 
director). 
Not  Salary  and bonus  17,560,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (rough1  y 
Jomu  (managing  140,000 
director).  dollars). 
Salary  and bonus 
earned  by  each 
CEO. 
34,7 10,000 yen 
(rough1  y 
276,000 
dollars). 
Responses  of 21 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to a survey 
conducted  by  Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Responses  of 42 Japanese 
fmns  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to a survey 
conducted  by Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Responses  of 47 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to a survey 
conducted  by Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Responses  of  9 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to a survey 
conducted  by  Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Not  Salary  and bonus  10,920,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (rough1  y 
torishimari  (junior  88,000 
director)  without  dollars). 
departmental 
position. 
Responses  of 44 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to a survey 
conducted  by  Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Not  Salary  and bonus  13,730,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (roughly 
torishimari  (junior  109,000 
director)  with  dollars). 
departmental 
position. 
Responses  of  42 Japanese 
firms  with  1,000 or more 
employees  to  a survey 
conducted  by  Romu 
Gyosei  Kenkyu  Jo. 
Not  Salary  and bonus  12,280,OOO  yen 
reported.  earned  by  each  (rough1  y 
kansa  (statutory  98,000 
auditor).  dollars). 
Notes:  The  year-end  exchange  rates are used for conversion.  Due to large fluctuations  in exchange  rates, 
dollar  equivalents  are sensitive  to  exchange  rates. TABLE  2-SUMMARY  STATISTICS:  MEANS  (STANDARD  DEVIATION) 
Variables  All  firms  Group  firms 
(GROUP=  1) 
CEO  COMPENSATION 
in  yen 
SHAREHOLDER  RETURN 
ROA 
PROFIT  MARGIN 
EMPLOYMENT 
in  thousands 
SALES 
in  millions  of  yen 
ASSET 
in  millions  of  yen 
INVESTMENT 
in  millions  of  yenb 
R&D 
in  millions  of  yen” 
YEARS  OUTSIDE  FIRM 
in  years 
YEARS  BEFORE 
PROMOTION  in  years 
YEARS  AS  CEO 
in  years 
NO  COLLEGE 
41577000  40198000 
(39616000)  (41396000) 
0.073819  0.059959 
(0.025537)  (0.24899) 
0.028338  0.028248 
(0.022940)  (0.022573) 
0.026000  0.025 132 
(0.026345)  (0.025877) 
7.75 16  8.0185 
(12.451)  (11.229) 
395340  420640 
(718780)  (744260) 
344190  362240 
(581940)  (546140) 
21907  23347 
(39005)  (3965 1) 
18539  20356 
(45388)  (45900) 
9.2338  8.4483  11.632 
(13.208)  (12.53 1)  (15.016) 
24.890  25.690  22.447 
(13.957)  (13.468)  (15.284) 
6.4286  5.7845  8.3947 
(7.4429)  (7.3989)  (7.3247) 
0.032468  0.017241  0.078947 






0.0286  11 
(0.024338) 
0.028649 











I  I  I 
TOKYO  1 0.32468  0.3362  1  0.28947 
ECONOMICS  0.35714  0.32759  0.44737 
Notes:  “See  text  for  definitions  of  the  variables,  and  also  for  the  sources  and  methods  used  to 
assemble  the  data. 
“The  mean  and  S.D.  for  this  variable  are  based  on  153  firms. 
The  mean  and  S.D.  for  this  variable  are  based  on  133  firms. TABLE  3A-EFFECTS  ON  THE  LEVEL  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
OF  CORPORATE  GROUPS 
ROA  used  as  an  accounting  measure  of  profitability” 
Dependent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 
Independent 
Variables 
Alternative  firm  objectives  to  profitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is  defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  SALES  ASSET  INVESTMENT  R&D 
GROUP  -0.19932 
(2.137) 
SHAREHOLDER  0.0026784 
RETURN  (0.019) 
ROA  3.7973 
(1.610) 
In  I  0.13685 
(ALTERNATIVE)  1 (2.8 13) 
I 
YEARS  -0.014445 
OUTSIDE  FIRM  (1.942) 
YEARS  BEFORE  -0.010015 
PROMOTION  (1.323) 
YEARS  AS  CEO  0.013674 
(1.789) 
NO  COLLEGE  0.012452 
(0.092) 
0.061071  0.071456 
(0.448)  (0.477) 
3.0679  3.9675 
(1.375)  (1.657) 
I  0.13547  0.14200  0.13156  0.088430 
1 (2.759)  (2.954)  (3.567)  (2.747) 
I 
-0.013448  -0.012623  -0.014156  -0.0082678 
(1.825)  c  (1.757)  (1.996)  (0.975) 
-0.0096726  -0.0088891  -0.010130  -0.0013891 
(1.290)  (1.222)  (1.403)  (0.164) 
0.013792  0.015326  0.014954  0.020363 
(1.872)  (2.061)  (2.106)  (2.247) 
0.045840  0.066569  0.13609  -0.075830 
(0.3 14)  (0.443)  (0.866)  (0.520) 
-0.18721  -0.23741 





-0.043017  -0.040040 
(0.532)  (0.500) 
-0.083 125  -0.08 1453 
(1.035)  (1.020) 
Yes  yes 
-0.055560  -0.052572  -0.065482 
(0.699)  (0.654)  (0.735) 
-0.068545  -0.080590  -0.0693  15 
(0.861)  (1.017)  (0.839) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes:  See  text  for  definitions  of  the  variables,  and  also  for  the  sources  and  methods  used  to  assemble 
the  data. 
bThe  t-ratios  given  in  parentheses  are  based  on  the  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  of 
White  (1980). 
“The  data  allow  us  to  include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and  paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel;  Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. TABLE  3B--EFFECTS  ON  THE  LEVEL  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
OF  CORPORATE  GROUPS 
PROFIT  MARGIN  used  as  an  accounting  measure  of  profitability” 
I  Denendent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 
Independent 
Variables 
Alternative  firm  objectives  to  profitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is  defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  SALES  ASSET  INVESTMENT  R&D 
GROUP  -0.19264  -0.18738  -0.17917  -0.18122  -0.23447 
(2.043)  (1.994)  (1.888)  (1.907)  (2.332) 
SHAREHOLDER  -0.0073708  0.036585  0.012953  0.055588  0.058505 
RETURN  (0.053)  (0.272)  (0.099)  (0.423)  (0.403) 
PROFIT  2.5956  2.9240  2.6376  2.1034  2.5300 
MARGIN  (1.298)  (1.484)  (1.338)  (1.136)  (1.290) 
ALTERNATIVE)  F&Z/i)3  0.14427  0.14430  0.13737  0.094506 
(2.866)  (2.934)  (3.693)  (2.940) 
YEARS  -0.0 14896  -0.013683  -0.0 13228  -0.014479  -0.0089799 
OUTSIDE  FIRM  (2.020)  (1.882)  (1.864)  (2.063)  (1.064) 
YEARS  BEFORE  -0.010608  -0.010131  -0.0095118  -0.010592  -0.002  1580 
PROMOTION  (1.403)  (1.360)  (1.308)  (1.475)  (0.254) 
YEARS  AS  CEO  0.013973  0.014260  0.015468  0.015274  0.020994 
(1.796)  (1.908)  (2.042)  (2.128)  (2.245) 
NO  COLLEGE  0.039498  0.075304  0.098302  0.16308  -0.046465 
(0.308)  (0.533)  (0.676)  (1.080)  (0.33 1) 
TOKYO  -0.05 1826  -0.05 1268  -0.061912  -0.060259  -0.077346 
(0.644)  (0.643)  (0.782)  (0.752)  (0.872) 
ECONOMICS  -0.070792  -0.069009  0.054549  -0.070701  -0.054249 
(0.886)  (0.870)  (0.687)  (0.900)  (0.664) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
DUMMY” 
Notes:  *See  text  for  definitions  of  the  variables,  and  also  for  the  sources  and  methods  used  to  assemble 
the  data. 
“The  t-ratios  given  in  parentheses  are  based  on  the  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  of 
White  (1980). 
‘The  data  allow  us  to  include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and  paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel;  Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. TABLE  4A-CORPORATE  GROUPS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  ALTERNATIVE  FHUVl OBJECTIVES 
IN  THE  DETERMINATION  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
ROA  used as an accounting  measure  of profitability” 
Dependent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 
Independent  Variables  Alternative  firm  objectives  to  )rofitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  SALES  ~  ASSET  1 INVESTMENT  1 R&D 
GROUP  -0.35428  -1.6484 
(2.476)  (1.687) 
GROUP* 
ln(ALTERNATIVE) 
0.13904  0.12331 
(1.875)  (1.560) 
SHAREHOLDER  0.030598  0.68478 
RETURN  (0.222)  (0.489) 
ROA  3.4794  3.5061 
(1.589)  (1.710) 
In(ALTERNATIVE)  0.041542  0.051696 
(0.620)  (0.682) 
YEARS  OUTSIDE  -0.01365 1  -0.012712 
FIRM  (1.856)  (1.717) 
YEARS  BEFORE 
PROMOTION 
-0.0096880  -0.0095284 
(1.290)  (1.267) 
YEARS  AS  CEO  0.0 14328  0.015397 
(1.894)  (2.107) 
NO COLLEGE  0.027757  0.054473 
(0.196)  (0.361) 
TOKYO  -0.036337  -0.038008 
(0.461)  (0.484) 
ECONOMICS  -0.074324  -0.069685 
(0.940)  (0.905) 
INDUSTRY  Yes  Yes 
DUMMY” 
Notes: 
1  0.13785  0.12206  0.079862 
I (1.489)  (1.814)  (1.484) 
j  0.027194  0.085800  0.076101 
I (0.210)  (0.641)  (0.5 15) 
2.3339  2.7966  3.5336 
(1.306)  (1.341)  (1.551) 
I 0.043361  0.048212  0.030168 
i (0.489)  (0.784)  (0.625) 
-0.013163  -0.012413  -0.0077546 
(1.846)  (1.734)  (0.906) 
-0.0099225  -0.0092710  -0.0013939 
(1.360)  (1.263)  (0.163) 
0.016701  0.017308  0.02 1846 
(2.206)  (2.432)  (2.350) 
0.10522  0.085655  -0.083998 
(0.713)  (0.520)  (0.550) 
“See text for definitions  of the variables,  and also for the sources and methods  used to assemble  the data. 
‘The t-ratios  given  in parentheses  are based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors of White 
(1980). 
The  data  allow  us to include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel; Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. TABLE  4B-CORPORATE  GROUPS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  ALTERNATIVE  FIRM  OBJECTIVES 
IN  THE  DETERMINATION  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
PROFIT  MARGIN  used as an accounting  measure  of profitability” 
1 ~~  ~~~  ~~ ~~  ~  ~~  ~  ~  ~  Dependent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 






PROFIT  MARGIN 
ln(ALTERNATIVE) 
YEARS  OUTSIDE 
FIRM 
Alternative  firm  objectives  to  xofitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  1 SALES 
-0.35445 
(2.419) 
0.14462  0.13159 
(1.903)  (1.621) 
0.0225 17  0.064356 
(0.170)  (0.480) 
2.3584  2.6619 
(1.298)  (1.516) 
fl 
ASSET  1 INVESTMENT  1 R&D 
-1.7940  - 1.2763  -0.92423 
(1.587)  (1.973)  (1.878) 
2.3339  1.9354  2.1829 
(1.306)  (1.125)  (1.198) 
0.043361  0.051191  0.030195 
(0.489)  (0.83 1)  (0.616) 
-0.013163  -0.012643  -0.0083739 
(1.846)  (1.789)  (0.98 1) 
YEARS  BEFORE  -0.0 10224  -0.0098768  -0.0099225  -0.00965 16  -0.0021113 
PROMOTION  (1.365)  (1.324)  (1.360)  (1.324)  (0.246) 
YEARS  AS  CEO 
NO COLLEGE  0.053089 
(0.385) 
TOKYO  -0.044015  -0.048473  -0.054897  -0.055973  -0.054487 
(0.560)  (0.618)  (0.711)  (0.719)  (0.625) 
ECONOMICS  -0.06269 1  -0.058026  -0.047440  -0.062233  -0.051393 
(0.796)  (0.755)  (0.612)  (0.816)  (0.629) 
INDUSTRY 
DUMMY” 
Yes  Yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
Notes:  “See text for definitions  of the variables,  and also for the sources and methods  used to assemble  the data. 
bathe t-ratios  given  in parentheses  are based on the heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors of White 
(1980). 
“The data  allow  us to include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel;  Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. TABLE  SA-CORPORATE  GROUPS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  TENURE 
IN  THE  DETERMINATION  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
ROA  used  as  an  accounting  measure  of  profitability” 
Dependent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 
Independent  Variables  Alternative  firm  objectives  to  profitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is  defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  t  SALES  t  ASSET  I  INVESTMENT  R&D 
GROUP  I  -0.79357 
~ (1.622) 
~  -0.09060  1 
(0.766) 
r  ~  ~  0.07848  1 
~ (0.526) 
-0.43702  -1.8252  -1.9282  -1.4434 
(2.285)  (1.805)  (1.719)  (2.143) 
0.085918  0.010632  0.011624  0.0 12378 
(0.747)  (0.986)  (1.056)  (1.131) 
0.02829  1  0.066464  0.035089  0.083575 
(0.205)  (0.474)  (0.258)  (0.622) 
3.4672  3.5029  3.7015  2.7822 
(1.606)  (1.744)  (1.733)  (1.363) 
0.03 1464  0.0493  18  0.042896  0.043690 
(0.455)  (0.657)  (0.500)  (0.709) 







In  (ALTERNATIVE) 
GROUP* 
ln(ALTERNATIVE) 




/  ;@;;;;59  /  ,k;;;;“’  (  ,&;&  11  ~ -0.077905 
(0.903) 










NO  COLLEGE  -0.056609 
(0.346) 
TOKYO  -0.044632 
(0.511) 





Notes:  “See text  for  definitions  of  the  variables,  and  also  for  the  sources  and  methods  used  to  assemble  the  data. 
bThe  t-ratios  given  in  parentheses  are based  on  the  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  of  White 
(1980). 
‘The  data  allow  us  to  include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and  paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel;  Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. TABLE  5&CORPORATE  GROUPS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  TENURE 
IN  THE  DETERMINATION  OF  CEO  COMPENSATION 
PROFIT  MARGIN  used  as  an  accounting  measure  of  profitability” 
I  Dependent  Variable:  ln(CE0  COMPENSATION) 
Independent  Variables  Alternative  firm  objectives  to  profitability,  ALTERNATIVE  is  defined  as: 
EMPLOYMENT  SALES  ASSET  INVESTMENT  R&D 
GROUP  -0.4366  1  -1.9179  -1.9983  -1.4685  -0.84093 
(2.246)  (1.847)  (1.731)  (2.140)  (1.672) 
GROUP*YEARS  AS  0.085227  0.010828  0.011587  0.012478  -0.098656 
CEO  (0.734)  (0.993)  (1.033)  (1.128)  (0.828) 
SHAREHOLDER  0.020242  0.062344  0.023933  0.079335  0.067844 
RETURN  (0.153)  (0.463)  (0.184)  (0.612)  (0.47 1) 
PROFIT  MARGIN  2.3414  2.6709  2.3341  1.9297  2.093 1 
(1.306)  (1.549)  (1.331)  (1.143)  (1.155) 
ln(ALTERNATlVE)  0.034277  0.05 1760  0.040022  0.046624  0.029364 
(0.49 1)  (0.68 1)  (0.459)  (0.756)  (0.605) 
GROUP*  0.15778  0.13945  0.14738  0.13603  0.085765 
ln(ALTERNATIVE)  (2.000)  (1.704  )  (1.592)  (1.950)  (1.557) 
YEARS  OUTSIDE  -0.014170  -0.012958  -0.013347  -0.012737  -0.084  13 1 
FIRM  (1.970)  (1.796)  (1.893)  (1.832)  (0.979) 
YEARS  BEFORE  -0.010107  -0.098141  -0.098892  -0.095 180  -0.024425 
PROMOTION  (1.364)  (1.337)  (1.379)  (1.331)  (0.279) 
YEARS  AS  CEO  0.08 1766  0.079154  0.08 1044  0.084892  0.030223 
(0.706)  (0.73 1)  (0.734)  (0.775)  (2.792) 
NO  COLLEGE  0.028625  0.048195  0.070823  0.067758  -0.029474 
(0.202)  (0.325)  (0.482)  (0.416)  (0.181) 
TOKYO  -0.042995  -0.049654  -0.056282  -0.057030  -0.05225  1 
(0.547)  (0.628)  (0.725)  (0.729)  (0.597) 
ECONOMICS  -0.064216  -0.06043  1  -0.049875  -0.065064  -0.047362 
(0.816)  (0.788)  (0.645)  (0.855)  (0.579) 
INDUSTRY  yes  yes  yes  Yes  Yes 
DUMMY” 
,, 
siqqjb  .s@e 
C”  ”  ““““” 
Notes:  ‘See  text  for  definitions  of  the  variables,  and  also  for  the  sources  and  methods  used  to  assemble  the  data. 
bThe t-ratios  given  in parentheses  are  based  on  the  heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard  errors  of  White 
(1980). 
“The  data  allow  us  to  include  the  following  10 industry  dummy  variables:  Foods;  Pulp  and  paper; 
Chemicals;  Rubber;  Stone;  Steel;  Nonferrous  Metals;  Machinery;  Electrical  machinery;  and 
Transportation  equipment. 